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Abstract
We consider differentially private approximate singular vector computation. Known
worst-case lower bounds show that the error of any differentially private algorithm must
scale polynomially with the dimension of the singular vector. We are able to replace this
dependence on the dimension by a natural parameter known as the coherence of the matrix
that is often observed to be significantly smaller than the dimension both theoretically
and empirically. We also prove a matching lower bound showing that our guarantee is
nearly optimal for every setting of the coherence parameter. Notably, we achieve our
bounds by giving a robust analysis of the well-known power iteration algorithm, which
may be of independent interest. Our algorithm also leads to improvements in worst-case
settings and to better low-rank approximations in the spectral norm.
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1 Introduction
Spectral analysis of graphs and matrices is one of the most fundamental tools in data mining.
The singular vectors of data matrices are used for spectral clustering, principal component
analysis, latent semantic indexing, manifold learning, multi-dimensional scaling, low rank
matrix approximation, collaborative filtering, and matrix completion. They provide a means
of avoiding the curse of dimensionality by discovering an (approximate) low-dimensional
representation of seemingly very high dimensional data. Unfortunately, many of the datasets
for which spectral methods are ideal are composed of sensitive user information: browsing
histories, friendship networks, movie reviews, and other data collected from private user
interactions. The Netflix prize dataset is a perfect example of this phenomenon: a dataset
of supposedly "anonymized" user records was released for the Netflix Prize Challenge,
which was a matrix of user/movie review pairs. The goal of the competition was to predict
user/movie review pairs missing from the matrix. Unfortunately, the ad-hoc anonymization
of this dataset proved to be insufficient, and Narayanan and Shmatikov [NS08] were able to
re-identify many of the users. Because of the privacy concerns that the attack brought to
light, the second proposed Netflix challenge was canceled.
In the past decade, a rigorous formulation of privacy known as differential privacy has
been developed, along with a collection of powerful theoretical results. With very few
exceptions, existing algorithms come with utility guarantees that hold in the worst case over
the choice of the private data. As a result, these utility bounds can sometimes be too weak to
be meaningful on particular data sets of interest.
Several algorithms are known for computing approximate top singular vectors of a matrix
under differential privacy. In fact, nearly optimal error bounds are known in the worst case.
Unfortunately, differential privacy unavoidably forces these bounds to degrade with the
dimension of the data. More concretely, given an n×n matrix A, any differentially private
algorithm must in the worst case output a vector x such that ‖Ax‖2 6 σ1(A)−O(
√
n), where
σ1(A) denotes the top singular value of A. If the matrix A has bounded entries and is sparse
as is very common, the dependence on n in the error term can easily overwhelm the signal.
This dependence on n is discouraging, because one of the most compelling goals of tools
such as PCA is to overcome the “curse of dimensionality” inherent in the analysis of very
high dimensional data. We therefore ask the question: Can we hope to achieve a nearly
dimension-free bound under a reasonable assumption on the input matrix?
We answer this question in the affirmative. Specifically, we give an algorithm to compute
an approximate singular vector that achieves error O(
√
µ(A) log(n)). Here, µ(A) denotes the
coherence of the input matrix. The coherence varies between 1 and n. We say that A has
low coherence if µ(A) is significantly smaller than n. Roughly, a matrix has low coherence if
none of its singular vectors have any large coordinates. Low coherence is a widely observed
property of large matrices. Random models exhibit low coherence as well as many real-world
matrices. Indeed, many recent results in matrix completion, Robust Principal Component
Analysis and Low-rank approximation rely crucially on the assumption that the input matrix
has low coherence. The error of our algorithm depends essentially only on the square root
of the coherence of the data matrix. Moreover, we show that the exact dependence on the
coherence that we achieve is best possible: Specifically, for each value of the coherence
parameter, we give a family of matrices for which no differentially private algorithm can get
a better approximation to the top singular vector than our algorithm does, up to logarithmic
2
factors.
Our algorithm is also highly efficient and can be implemented using a nearly linear
number of vector inner product computations. In particular, our running time is nearly
linear in the number of nonzeros of the matrix. In fact, our algorithm is a new variant of the
classical power iteration method that has long been the basis of many practical eigenvalue
solvers.
1.1 Our Results
We say that a matrix A ∈Rm×n with singular value decomposition A =UΣV t has coherence
µ(A) def=
{
m‖U‖2∞,n‖V ‖2∞
}
.
For now we assume that m = n, but all of our results apply to general matrices. Note that
µ(A) ∈ [1,n]. We give a simple (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm which achieves the
following guarantee.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal, some parameters hidden). For any matrix A that satisfies a mild
assumption on the decay of its singular values, Private Power Iteration returns a vector x such that
with high probability
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ > σ1(A)−O
(
ε−1
√
µ(A) log(1/δ) logn
)
We also show a nearly matching lower bound:
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For any coherence parameter c ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, there exists a family of
matrices A such that for each A ∈ A, µ(A) = c, and such that for every (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithm M with δ =Ω(1/n) there is a matrix A ∈ A so that with high probability, M(A) outputs
a vector x such that ‖Ax‖2
‖x‖2 6 σ1(A)−Ω
(
ε−1
√
µ(A)
)
Note that in addition to showing that our dependence on µ(A) is tight, this theorem shows
that the error of any data-independent guarantee must be at least Ω
(
ε−1
√
n
)
.
Finally, we show how our algorithm can be used to compute accurate rank k-approximations
to the private matrix A in the spectral norm, for any k. For k = 1, the quality of our approxi-
mation is optimal. For k > 2, as in previous work [HR12], our bounds depend on r, where r
is the rank of A. Note that these bounds still improve on the best worst-case bounds when A
is low rank.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal, some parameters hidden). There is an (ε,δ)-differentially private
algorithm such that for any matrix A that satisfies a mild assumption on the decay of its singular
values, it returns a rank-1 matrix A1 such that with high probability
‖A−A1‖2 6 σ2(A) +O
(
ε−1
√
µ(A) log(1/δ) logn
)
Moreover, there is an (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm such that for any rank r matrix A that
satisfies a mild assumption on the decay of its singular values, it returns a rank-k matrix Ak such
that with high probability:
‖A−Ak‖2 6 σk+1(A) +O
(
ε−1k2
√
(r ·µ(A) + k logn) log(1/δ) logn
)
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1.2 More efficient and improved worst-case bounds
Our robust power iteration analysis can also be applied easily to worst-case settings without
any incoherence assumptions. For example, we resolve multiple questions asked by Kapralov
and Talwar [KT13]. Specifically, we improve the running time of their algorithm by large
polynomial factors, give a much simpler algorithm and improve the error dependence on k.
In the main body of the paper we study differential privacy under changes of single entries.
Here, we consider unit changes in spectral norm as proposed by [KT13]. Our algorithm
easily adapts to this definition and gives the following corollary.
Corollary 1.4. There is an algorithm such that for every matrix A that satisfies a mild assumption
on the decay of its singular values, it returns a rank-k matrix Ak such that with high probability,
‖A−Ak‖2 6 σk+1(A) +O
(
ε−1k2
√
n log(1/δ) logn
)
. (1)
Moreover, the algorithm satisfies (ε,δ)-differential privacy under unit spectral perturbations. For
(ε,0)-differential privacy the error bound satisfies
‖A−Ak‖2 6 σk+1(A) +O
(
ε−1k2n logn
)
.
We stress that Equation 1 is the first bound for (ε,δ)-differential privacy under unit
spectral norm perturbations. The dependence on nmatches the error achieved by randomized
response for single entry changes.
1.3 Our Techniques
Our main technical contribution includes a novel “robust” analysis of the classical power
iteration algorithm for computing the top eigenvector of a matrix, which may be of inde-
pendent interest. Specifically, we analyze power iteration in which an arbitrary sequence of
perturbations g1, . . . , gt may be added to the matrix vector products at each round 1, . . . ,T . We
give simple conditions on the perturbation vectors g1, . . . , gt such that under these conditions,
perturbed powering of a matrix A ∈Rn×n for O(logn) rounds results in a vector x such that:
‖Ax‖/‖x‖ > (1−β)σ1(A) where σ1(A) is the top singular value of A. Using this general analysis,
we are then free to choose the perturbations appropriately to guarantee differential privacy.
The accuracy bounds we obtain are a function of the scale of the noise that is necessary for
privacy.
It is immediate that the magnitude of the perturbation that must be used to guarantee
differential privacy (of the matrix) when computing a matrix vector product is proportional
to the magnitude of the largest coordinate in the vector. To prove our accuracy guarantees,
therefore, it suffices to bound the maximum magnitude of any coefficient of any of the
vectors x1, . . . ,xT that emerge during the steps of power iteration. Of course, if the matrix is
incoherent, then each xt can be written as a linear combination of basis vectors that each have
small coordinates xt =
∑n
i=1αivi . Unfortunately this does not suffice to guarantee that xt will
have small coordinates without incurring a blow-up that depends on the number of nonzero
coefficients. However, we show that at each round, sign(α1), . . . ,sign(αn) are independent,
unbiased {−1,1} random variables. This, together with the incoherence assumption, is enough
to complete the analysis.
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Finding a unit vector x such that ‖Ax‖ > (1− β)σ1(A) is sufficient to compute an accurate
rank-1 approximation to A in spectral norm. If x was exactly equal to the top singular vector
of A, we could then recurse, and compute the top singular vector of A′ = A− σ1xxT , from
which we could compute an optimal rank 2 approximation to A. Unfortunately, x is only an
approximation to the top singular vector. Therefore, in order to be able to usefully recurse
on A′ = A− σ̂1xxT , we require two conditions: (1) That ‖A′‖2 ≈ σ2(A), and (2) that A′ is nearly
as incoherent as A. Condition (1) has already been shown by Kapralov and Talwar [KT13].
Therefore, it remains for us to show condition (2). We show that indeed the incoherence
of the matrix cannot increase by more than a factor of
√
r, where r is the rank of A, during
any number of “deflation” steps. However, we do not know whether this factor of
√
r is
necessary, or is merely an artifact of our analysis. We leave removing this factor of
√
r from
our approximation factor for computing rank-k approximations when k > 2 as an intriguing
open problem.
Finally, we give a pointwise lower bound that shows that (up to log factors), our algorithm
for privately computing singular vectors is tight for every setting of the coherence parameter. We
do this by reducing to reconstruction lower bounds of Dinur and Nissim [DN03]. Specifically,
we show, for every coherence parameter C, how to construct a matrix with coherence C from
some private bit-valued database D such that improving on the performance of our algorithm
would imply that an adversary would be able to reconstruct D. Since reconstruction attacks
are precluded by reasonable values of ε and δ, a lower bound for all (ε,δ) private algorithms
follows.
1.4 Related Work
There is by now an extensive literature on a wide variety of differentially private computa-
tions, which we do not attempt to survey here. Instead we focus on only the most relevant
recent work.
There are several papers that consider the problem of privately approximating the
singular vectors of a matrix without any assumptions on the data. Blum et al. [BDMN05]
first studied this problem, and gave a simple “input perturbation” algorithm based on
adding noise directly to the covariance matrix. Chaudhuri et al [CSS12] and Kapralov and
Talwar [KT13] give matching worst-case upper and lower bounds for privately computing
the top eigenvector of a matrix under the constraint of (ε,0)-differential privacy: They
achieve additive error O(n/ε). Both algorithms involve sampling a singular vector from the
exponential mechanism. [KT13] also give a polynomial time algorithm for performing this
sampling from the exponential mechanism, whereas [CSS12] give a heuristic, but practical
implementation using Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo. Our algorithm matches these worst case
bounds, and also gives worst case bounds for (ε,δ)-privacy, with error O(
√
n/ε). In the event
that the matrix has low coherence, we improve substantially over the worst case bounds.
Moreover, we give the first analysis of a natural, efficient algorithm for this problem. Indeed,
our algorithm is simply a variant on the classic power iteration method, and runs in time
nearly linear in the input sparsity.
Low coherence conditions have been recently studied in a number of papers for a number
of matrix problems, and is a commonly satisfied condition on matrices. Recently, Candes
and Recht [CR09] and Candes and Tao [CT10] considered the problem of matrix completion.
Accurate matrix completion is impossible for arbitrary matrices, but [CR09, CT10] show
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the remarkable result that it is possible under low coherence assumptions. Candes and Tao
[CT10] also show that almost every matrix satisfies a low coherence condition, in the sense
that randomly generated matrices will be low coherence with extremely high probability.
Talwalkar and Rostamizadeh recently used low-coherence assumptions for the problem
of (non-private) low-rank matrix approximation [TR10]. They showed that under low-
coherence assumptions similar to those of [CR09, CT10], the spectrum of a matrix is in
fact well approximated by a small number of randomly sampled columns, and give formal
guarantees on the approximation quality of the sampling based Nyström method of low-rank
matrix approximation.
Most related to this paper is Hardt and Roth [HR12], which gives an algorithm for giving
a rank-k approximation to a private matrix A in the Frobenius norm, where the approximation
quality also depends on a (slightly different) notion of matrix coherence. This work differs
from [HR12] in several respects. First, a matrix may not have any good approximation in
the Frobenius norm (and hence the bounds of [HR12] might be vacuous), but still might
have an excellent approximation in the spectral norm. Second, [HR12] does not give any
means to actually compute the top singular vector of the private matrix, and hence cannot
be easily used for applications (such as PCA, or spectral clustering) that require direct
access to the singular vector itself. Moreover, unlike in this paper, [HR12] do not show that
their dependence on the coherence is tight—only that their guarantees surpass any data-
independent worst case guarantees. The bounds of [HR12] also incur a constant multiplicative
error, in addition to an additive error. In this paper, we are able to avoid any multiplicative
error. Finally, the bounds of [HR12] depend on the rank of the private matrixA, a dependence
that we are able to remove when computing the top singular vector of A, as well as a rank 1
approximation of A.
Related to the problem of approximating the spectrum of a matrix is the problem of
approximating cuts in a graph. This problem was first considered by Gupta, Roth, and
Ullman [GRU12] who gave methods for efficiently releasing synthetic data for graph cuts
with additive error O(n1.5). Blocki et al [BBDS12] gave a method which achieves improved
error for small cuts, but does not improve the worst-case error. Improving these bounds to the
information theoretically optimal bound of O(n logn) via an efficient algorithm remains an
interesting open question. Note that smaller error is efficiently achievable for a polynomial
number of cut queries, using private multiplicative weights [HR10] or randomized response.
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2 Preliminaries
We view our dataset as a real valued matrix A ∈Rm×n.
Definition 2.1. We say that two matrices A,A′ ∈Rm×n are neighboring if A−A′ = αeseTt where
es, et are two standard basis vectors and α ∈ [−1,1]. In other words A and A′ differ in precisely
one entry by at most 1 in absolute value.
We use the by now standard privacy solution concept of differential privacy:
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Definition 2.2. An algorithm M : Rm×n → R (where R is some arbitrary abstract range) is
(ε,δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of neighboring databases A,A′ ∈ Rm×n, and for all
subsets of the range S ⊆ R we have P {M(A) ∈ S} 6 exp(ε)P {M(A′) ∈ S}+ δ .
We make use of the following useful facts about differential privacy.
Fact 2.3. If M : Rm×n → R is (ε,δ)-differentially private, and M ′ : R → R′ is an arbitrary
randomized algorithm mapping R to R′, then M ′(M(·)) :Rm×n→ R′ is (ε,δ)-differentially private.
The following useful theorem of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan tells us how differential
privacy guarantees compose.
Theorem 2.4 (Composition [DRV10]). Let ε,δ ∈ (0,1),δ′ > 0. If M1, . . . ,Mk are each (ε,δ)-
differentially private algorithms, then the algorithm M(A) ≡ (M1(A), . . . ,Mk(A)) releasing the
concatenation of the results of each algorithm is (kε,kδ)-differentially private. It is also (ε′ , kδ+δ′)-
differentially private for ε′ <
√
2k ln(1/δ′)ε+ 2kε2.
We denote the 1-dimensional Gaussian distribution of mean µ and variance σ2 by
N (µ,σ2). We use N (µ,σ2)d to denote the distribution over d-dimensional vectors with i.i.d.
coordinates sampled from N (µ,σ2). We write X ∼ D to indicate that a variable X is dis-
tributed according to a distribution D. We note the following useful fact about the Gaussian
distribution.
Fact 2.5. If gi ∼N (µi ,σ2i ), then
∑
gi ∼N
(∑
i µi ,
∑
i σ
2
i
)
.
The following theorem is well known folklore.
Theorem 2.6 (Gaussian Mechanism). Let ε > 0, δ ∈ (0,1/2). Let u,v ∈ Rd be any two vectors
such that ‖u − v‖2 6 c. Put σ = 4cε−1
√
log(2/δ). Then, for every measurable set A ⊆ Rd and
g ∼N (0,σ2)d , we have exp(−ε)P{v + g ∈ A} − δ 6 P {u + g ∈ A} 6 exp(ε)P{v + g ∈ A}+ δ .
Vector and matrix norms. We denote by ‖ · ‖p the `p-norm of a vector and sometimes use
‖ · ‖ as a shorthand for the Euclidean norm. Given a real m×n matrix A, we will work with
the spectral norm ‖A‖2 and the Frobenius norm ‖A‖F defined as
‖A‖2 def= max‖x‖=1‖Ax‖ and ‖A‖F
def=
√∑
i,j
a2ij . (2)
For any m×n matrix A of rank r we have ‖A‖2 6 ‖A‖F 6
√
r · ‖A‖2 .
Singular Value Decomposition. Given a matrix A ∈ Rm×n. The right singular vectors of A
are the eigenvectors of ATA. The left singular vectors of A are the eigenvectors of AAT . The
singular values of A are denoted by σi(A) and defined as the square root of the i-th eigenvalue
of ATA. The singular value decomposition is any decomposition of A satisfying A =UΣV T
where U ∈Rm×m,V ∈Rn×n are unitary matrices and Σ ∈Rm×n satisfies Σii = σi(A) and Σij = 0
for i , j. The colums of U are the left singular vectors of A and the columns of V are the right
singular vectors of A.
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2.1 Matrix coherence
We will work with the following standard notion of coherence throughout the paper.
Definition 2.7 (µ-Coherence). Let A ∈ Rm×n with m 6 n be a symmetric real matrix with a
given singular value decomposition A =UΣV t . We define the µ-coherence of A with respect
to U and V as
µ(A) def= max
{
m‖U‖2∞,n‖V ‖2∞
}
.
Note that 1 6 µ(A) 6 n.
We remark that the coherence of A is defined with respect to a particular singular value
decomposition since the SVD is in general not unique.
2.2 Reduction to symmetric matrices
Throughout our work we will restrict our attention real symmetric n × n matrices. All of
our results apply, however, more generally to asymmetric matrices. Indeed, given A ∈Rm×n
with SVD A =
∑r
i=1σiuiv
T
i and rank r, we can instead consider the symmetric (m+n)× (m+n)
matrix
B =
[
0 A
AT 0
]
.
The next fact summarizes all properties of B that we will need.
Fact 2.8. The matrix B has the following properties: B has a rank 2r and singular values σ1, . . . ,σr
each occuring with multiplicity two. The singular vectors corresponding to a singular value σ
are spanned by the vectors {(ui ,0), (0,vi) : σi = σ } . An entry change in A corresponds to two entry
changes in B. Furthermore, µ(B) = µ(A).
In particular, this fact implies that an algorithm to find the singular vectors of B will
also recover the singular vectors of A up to small loss in the parameters. Moreover, an
algorithm that achieves (ε/2,δ/2)-differential privacy on B is also (ε,δ)-differentially private
with respect to A.
3 Robust convergence of power iteration
In this section we analyze a generic variant of power iteration in which a perturbation is
added to the computation at each step. The noise vector can be chosen adaptively and
adversarially in each round. We will derive general conditions under which power iteration
converges.
Lemma 3.1 (Robust Convergence). Let A be a matrix such that σk+1(A) 6 (1−γ)σk(A) for some
k < n and γ > 0. Let U be the space spanned by the top k singular vector of A, let V be the space
spanned by the last n− k singular vectors. Further assume that there are numbers ∆,∆U ,∆V > 0
such that the following conditions are met:
1. For all t, ‖gt‖ 6 ∆, ‖PUgt‖ 6 ∆U and ‖PV gt‖ 6 ∆V .
2. ‖PUx0‖ > 8∆Uγσk(A) and ‖PV x0‖ >
8∆V
γσk(A)
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Input: Matrix A ∈Rn×n, number of iterations T ∈N, parameter β ∈ (0,1),
1. Let x0 be unit vector.
2. For t = 1 to T :
(a) Let gt be an arbitrary perturbation.
(b) Let x′t = Axt−1 + gt,
(c) If ‖x′t‖ > (1− β)σ1, then terminate and output xt−1.
(d) Otherwise let xt =
x′t
‖x′t‖2 , and continue.
Output: Vector xT ∈Rn unless the algorithm terminated previously.
Figure 1: Power iteration with adversarial noise
3. σk(A) > 9∆/βγ, for some 0 < β < 1.
Then, for T = 4log(σk(A)), the algorithm outputs a vector x ∈Rn such that
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ > (1− β)σk(A) .
Proof. Put σ = σk(A) and note that by assumption σk+1 = (1− γ)σk for some γ > 0. We will
consider the potential function
Ψt =
‖PV xt‖
‖PUxt‖ .
Suppose that in some round t, we have
σ‖PV xt−1‖ > 8∆Vγ and σ‖PUxt−1‖ >
8∆U
γ
. (3)
We note that by our assumption on the matrix, these conditions are met in the first round
t = 1 as a consequence of Item 2. Let us derive an expression for the potential drop in round
t under the above assumption. We have, using Item 1,
‖PV xt‖
‖PUxt‖ =
‖PV (Axt−1 + gt)‖
‖PU (Axt−1 + gt)‖ 6
‖PVAxt−1‖+ ‖PV gt‖
‖PUAxt−1‖ − ‖PUgt‖ 6
(1−γ)σ‖PV xt−1‖+∆V
σ‖PUxt−1‖ −∆U
By the assumption in Equation 3, we have
(1−γ)σ‖PV xt−1‖+∆V
σ‖PUxt−1‖ −∆U 6
(1− 7γ/8)σ‖PV xt−1‖
(1−γ/8)σ‖PUxt−1‖ 6
(
1− γ
2
) ‖PV xt−1‖
‖PUxt−1‖ =
(
1− γ
2
)
Ψt−1
We furthermore claim that if the conditions in Equation 3 hold true in round t, then we must
have ‖PUxt‖ > ‖PUxt−1‖ . This follows from our previous analysis, because Ψt 6 Ψt−1 but
1 = ‖xt‖ =
√
‖PUxt‖2 + ‖PV xt‖2 .
This in particular means that if the conditions are true in round t, then the second condition
in Equation 3 continues to be true in round t + 1, and only the first condition can fail. At this
point we distinguish two cases.
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Case 1. Suppose there is a round where the t 6 T , where the first condition fails to hold.
Let t∗ be the smallest such round and put x = xt∗−1. By the previous argument, in this round
we must have
1 = ‖x‖2 = ‖PV x‖2 + ‖PUx‖2 6
(
8∆V
γσ
)2
+ ‖PUx‖2 . (4)
From this we conclude that ‖PUx‖ >
√
1− (8∆V /γσ )2 > 1− 8∆V /γσ . Hence,
‖Axt∗−1 + gt∗‖ > ‖APUx‖ − ‖gt‖ >
(
1− 8∆V
γσ
)
σ −∆ >
(
1− 8∆
γσ
− ∆
σ
)
σ >
(
1− 9∆
γσ
)
σ
Here we used that ∆V 6 ∆ which is without loss of generality. Therefore, using Item 3,
‖x′t∗‖ >
(
1− 9∆
γσ
)
σ > (1− β)σ1 ,
This means that the algorithm terminates in round t∗ and outputs xt∗−1, which satisfies the
conclusion of the lemma.
Case 2. Suppose there is no round t 6 T , where Equation 3 fails. By our potential argument
and the choice of T , this means that
ΨT 6
(
1− γ
2
)T
Ψ0 6
exp(−γT /2)
‖PUx0‖ 6
γσ
8∆U
exp(−γT /2) = γ
8∆Uσ
6 β
In particular, x + T satisfies ‖PV xT ‖ 6 β‖PUxT ‖ 6 β. Thus, ‖PUxT ‖ >
√
1− β2 and ‖AxT ‖ >
(1− β)σ. This show that xT satisfies the conclusion of the lemma. 
The next corollary states a variant of Lemma 3.1 where we express all conditions in terms
of σ1(A) rather than σk(A).
Corollary 3.2. Let α ∈ (0,1). Let A be a matrix such that σk+1(A) 6 (1−γ/2)σ1(A) for some k < n.
LetU be the space spanned by the top k singular vector of A, let V be the space spanned by last n−k
singular vectors. Further assume that there are numbers ∆,∆U ,∆V > 0 such that the following
conditions are met:
1. For all t, ‖gt‖ 6 ∆, ‖PUgt‖ 6 ∆U and ‖PV gt‖ 6 ∆V .
2. ‖PUx0‖ > 32k∆Uγ(1−γ)σ1(A) and ‖PV x0‖ >
32k∆V
γ(1−γ)σ1(A)
3. σ1(A) > 72k∆βγ(1−γ) .
Then, for T = 4log(σ1(A)), the algorithm outputs a vector x ∈Rn such that
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ > (1− β)σ1(A) .
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Proof. We claim that there exists a k′ 6 k such that σk′ (A) 6 (1−γ/4k)σ1(A). Indeed, if this is
not the case then
σk(A) >
k∏
i=1
(
1− γ
4k
)
σ1(A) >
(
1− γ
2
)
σ1(A),
thus violating the assumption of the lemma. Moreover, k′ satisfies σk′ (A) > (1 − γ2 )σ1(A).
We will thus apply Lemma 3.1 to this k′ setting γ ′ = γ/4k. It is easy to verify that by our
assumptions above, the conditions of Lemma 3.1 are satisfied. Hence, the output x of the
algorithm satisfies
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ > (1−
γ
2
)σk′ (A) > (1−γ/2)2σ1(A) > (1−γ)σ1(A).

Remark 3.3. We will typically need k in Corollary 3.2 to be relatively small compared to n. We
think of this as a mild assumption even when k and α are constant. In particular, it is implied by
the assumption that A has a good low-rank approximation for small k. Indeed, if σk+1 > (1−α)σ1,
then the best rank k approximation to A has spectral error (1−α)‖A‖2.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Power Iteration
We will next turn the robust power iteration algorithm from the previous section into a
privacy-preserving version. The algorithm is outlined below.
Input: Matrix A ∈ Rn×n, number of iterations T ∈N, privacy parameters ε,δ > 0, upper
bound on coherence C > 0.
1. Let σ = 2ε−1
√
4T log(1/δ).
2. Let x0 = g0 ∼N (0,1/n)n.
3. For t = 1 to T :
(a) If ‖xt−1‖2∞ > C/n, terminate and output “fail”.
(b) Let gt ∼N
(
0, Cσ
2
n
)n
(c) Let x′t = Axt−1 + gt
(d) Put xt =
x′t
‖x′t‖2
Output: Vector xT ∈Rn
Figure 2: Private power iteration (PPI)
Lemma 3.4. The algorithm PPI satisfies (ε,δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. By Theorem 2.6, the algorithm satisfies (ε′ ,δ)-differential privacy in each round. Here,
ε′ was chosen small enough so that Theorem 2.4 implies (ε,δ)-differential privacy for the
algorithm over all. 
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The next lemma states the guarantees of the algorithm assuming that it successfully
terminates.
Lemma 3.5. Let α > 0. Let A be a matrix satisfying σk 6 (1 − γ/2)σ1 for some k > 1. Put
T = 4log(σ1(A)). Further assume that for some β > 0, A satisfies
‖A‖2 =
ΘT k
√
C log(n) log(1/δ)
εγβ
. (5)
for some sufficiently large constant Θ > 0. Assume that PPI terminates successfully and outputs xT
on input of A, T , and C. Then, with probability 9/10,
‖AxT ‖ > (1− β)‖A‖2 .
Proof. Our goal is to apply Corollary 3.2. For this we need to verify that A and gt satisfy
various assumptions of the lemma. Put ∆ =
√
4C log(n)σ. With this choice of ∆, we have by
basic Gaussian concentration bounds (see Lemma A.2):
1. P {‖gt‖ > ∆} 6 1/n2.
2. P
{
‖PUgt‖ >
√
k
n∆
}
6 1/n2.
3. P
{
‖PV gt‖ >
√
n−k
n ∆
}
6 1/n2.
Hence, with probability 1− 1/n, none of these events occur for any t ∈ [T ]. This verifies that
the first assumption of Corollary 3.2 holds with high probability for this setting of ∆. Further
note that, by Gaussian anti-concentration bounds (as stated in Lemma A.2) the following
claims are true:
1. P
{
‖PUx0‖ >
√
k
50en
}
> 98/100
2. P
{
‖PV x0‖ >
√
n−k
50en
}
> 98/100
Hence, both of these events occur with probability 96/100. On the other hand the sec-
ond condition of Corollary 3.2 requires that ‖PUx0‖ >O(k∆U /γσ1(A)). Assuming the event
‖PUx0‖ >
√
k/100n occurred this corresponds to a lower bound of the form σ1(A) >O(k∆/γ)
which is satisfied by Equation 9. The analogous argument applies to ‖PV x0‖. Finally, the
third condition of Lemma 3.1 follows by comparison with Equation 9. Hence, the lemma
follows. 
4 Power Iteration and Incoherence
We will next establish an important symmetry property of the algorithm. Specifically, we
will show that for any of the eigenvectors u of A (assuming A is symmetric), the sign of
the correlation between u and ny intermediate vector xt , i.e. sign(〈u,xt〉) is unbiased and
independent sign(〈v,xt〉) for any other eigenvector v. This property is rather obvious in
the noise-free case where xt is simply proportional to Atx0. Hence, the sign of 〈u,xt〉 is
determined by the sign of 〈u,x0〉. Intuitively, the property continues to hold in the noisy case,
because the noise that we add is symmetric.
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Lemma 4.1 (Sign Symmetry). Let A be a symmetric matrix given in its eigendecomposition as
A =
∑n
i=1σiuiu
T
i . Let t > 0 and put Xi = sign(〈ui ,xt〉) for i ∈ [n]. Then (X1, . . . ,Xn) is uniformly
distributed in {−1,1}n.
Proof. We will establish by induction on t that the following two conditions hold for every
t > 0 :
1. Yi(t) = 〈ui ,xt〉 is a symmetric random variable
2. sign(Yi(t)) is independent of Yj(t) for all j , i.
Observe that these two conditions imply the statement of the lemma. In the base case notice
that Yi(0) is just a random Gaussian variable N (0,1/n) and hence symmetric. Now, let t > 1
and consider
Yi(t) =
〈ui ,Axt−1 + gt〉
‖Axt−1 + gt‖ =
σi〈ui ,xt−1〉+ 〈ui , gt〉
‖Axt−1 + gt‖ =
σiYi(t − 1) + 〈ui , gt〉
‖Axt−1 + gt‖ .
Let Di = σiYi(t − 1) + 〈ui , gt〉. Notice that Di is a symmetric random variable, since it is the
sum of two independent symmetric random variable. Here we used the induction hypothesis
on Yi(t − 1). We can see that Yi(t) is a rescaling of a symmetric random variable, but we also
need to show that the rescaling is independent of sign(Di). Note that
‖Axt−1 + gt‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
uj
(
σi〈uj ,xt−1〉+ 〈uj , gt〉
)∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ =
√
n∑
i=1
D2i
This shows that the normalization term can be computed from D2i and σjYj(t−1) + 〈uj , gt〉 for
j , i. Note that each of these terms is independent of sign(Di). Here we used the induction
hypothesis on Yj(t − 1) and the fact that 〈uj , gt〉 are independent Gaussians for all j ∈ [n]. We
conclude that Yi(t) =
Di√
D21 +···+D2n
is a symmetric random variable.
It remains to show that sign(Yi(t)) is independent of Yj(t), for all j , [i]. We have al-
ready shown that the normalization term appearing in Yj(t) is statistically independent of
sign(Yi(t)). Moreover, by induction hypothesis, the numerator σjYj(t − 1) + 〈uj , gt〉 is statis-
tically independent of sign(Yi(t − 1)) and statistically independent of 〈ui , gt〉. In particular,
conditioning on any subset of the variables Yj(t), j , i leaves the two variables sign(Yi(t − 1))
and sign(〈ui , gt〉) unbiased. This implies that no matter what the value of |Yi(t−1)| and |〈ui , gt〉|
is, the variable sign(Yi(t)) is unbiased. 
We will use the previous lemma to bound the `∞-norm of the intermediate vectors
xt arising in power iteration in terms of the coherence of the input matrix. We need the
following large deviation bound.
Lemma 4.2. Let α1, . . . ,αn be scalars such that
∑n
i=1α
2
i = 1 and u1, . . . ,un are unit vectors in R
n.
Put B = maxni=1 ‖ui‖∞. Further let (s1, . . . , sn) be chosen uniformly at random in {−1,1}n. Then,
P

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
siαiui
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∞ > 4B
√
logn
 6 1/n3 .
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Proof. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi where Xi = siαiui . We will bound the deviation of X in each entry
and then take a union bound over all entries. Consider Z =
∑n
i=1Zi where Zi is the first
entry of Xi . The argument is identical for all other entries of X. We have EZ = 0 and
EZ2 =
∑n
i=1EZ
2
i 6 B
2 ∑n
i=1α
2
i = B
2. Hence, by Theorem A.3 (Chernoff bound),
P
{
|Z | > 4B√log(n)} 6 exp(−16B2 log(n)
4B2
)
6 exp(−4log(n)) = 1
n4
.
The claim follows by taking a union bound over all n entries of X. 
Lemma 4.3. Let A ∈ Rn×n. Suppose PPI is invoked on A, T 6 n, and C > 16µ(A) log(n) and
any choice of ε,δ > 0. Then, with probability 1−1/n, the algorithm terminates successfully after
round T .
Proof. The only way for the algorithm to terminate prematurely in step t + 1 is if the vector
xt satisfies ‖xt‖∞ > 4
√
µ(A) log(n)/n. We will argue that this happens only with probability
1/n2. Hence, by taking a union bound over all rounds T 6 n, we conclude that the algorithm
must terminate with probability 1− 1/n.
Indeed, letA =
∑n
i=1σiuiu
T
i be given in its eigendecomposition. Note that B = max
n
i=1 ‖ui‖∞ 6√
µ(A)/n. On the other hand, we can write xt =
∑n
i=1 siαiui where αi are non-negative scalars
such that
∑n
i=1α
2
i = 1, and si ∈ {−1,1}. Notice that si = sign(〈xt ,ui〉). Hence, by Lemma 4.1,
the signs (s1, . . . , sn) are distributed uniformly at random in {−1,1}n. Hence, by Lemma 4.2, it
follows that
P
{
‖xt‖∞ > 4B
√
logn
}
6 1/n3 .
Hene, a union bound over all t ∈ [T ] completes the proof. 
Finally, we can combine Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 4.3 to conclude that private power
iteration converges does not terminate prematurely and the output vector gives the desired
error bound.
Theorem 4.4. Let γ,β > 0. Let A be a matrix satisfying σk 6 (1 − γ/2)σ1 for some k > 1. Put
T = 4log(σ1(A)). Further assume A satisfies
‖A‖2 =
ΘT k
√
µ(A) log(1/δ) log(n)
εγβ
. (6)
for some sufficiently large constant Θ > 0. Then, with probability 8/10, on input of A, T , (ε,δ) and
C > 16µ(A) log(n), the algorithm PPI outputs a vector x, such that
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ > (1− β)‖A‖2 .
Equivalently:
‖AxT ‖ > σ1(A)−
ΘT k
√
C log(n) log(1/δ)
εγ
.
Proof. The proof follows directly by combining Lemma 3.5 applied with C = 16µ(A) log(n)
with Lemma 4.3. The latter lemma implies that for this setting the algorithm terminates with
probability 1− 1/n. The former lemma implies that the stated error bound holds in this case
with probability 9/10. Both event occur simultaneously with probability 9/10− o(1). 
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Remark 4.5 (On choosing T and C). As stated Theorem 4.4 requires the input to the algorithm to
depend on two sensitive quantities, i.e., σ1(A) and µ(A). It is easy to get rid of this using standard
techniques. We can upper bound σ1(A) by ‖A‖1 = ∑ij |Aij | which can be computed efficiently and
privately (as it is 1-sensitive). Since the dependence on σ1(A) in the choice of T is only logarithmic,
this can change the error bounds only by constant factors. To get rid of µ(A), we can try all choices
of C = 2i , i ∈ {0,1, . . . , log(n)}. Since µ(A) 6 n, this process will eventually find a setting of C that
gives the right upper bound up to an overestimate of at most a factor 2. As we need to scale down
(ε,δ) by a log(n) factor in each execution, the error bounds deteriorate by a O(log(n))-factor. This
loss can be replaced by O(loglogn) using the exponential mechanism [MT07]. We omit the details
as they are standard.
5 Rank k approximations and Deflation
In this section, we show how to successively call our algorithm for obtaining rank 1 approx-
imations to obtain a rank k approximation. To do this, we need to argue two things. First,
we must argue that approximately optimal rank 1 approximations to successively ‘deflated’
versions of our original matrix can be combined to yield an approximately optimal rank
k approximation. Second, we must argue that incoherence is propagated throughout the
deflation process, so that we can in fact obtain good rank 1 approximations to the deflated
matrices.
Input: Matrix A ∈ Rn×n, target rank k, number of iterations T ∈ N, privacy parameters
ε,δ > 0, upper bound on coherence C > 0.
1. Let ε′ = ε/(
√
4k ln(1/δ)), δ′ = δ/k
2. Let A0← A, B0← 0.
3. For i = 1 to k:
(a) Let vi ← PPI(Ai−1,T ,ε′ ,δ′ ,C)
(b) Let σ̂i = ‖Ai−1vi‖2 + Lap(1/ε′)
(c) Let Ai ← Ai−1 − σ̂ivivTi , Bi ← Bi−1 + σ̂ivivTi .
Output: Matrix Ak
Figure 3: Rank k approximation (rank-k).
Our analysis will be based on a useful lemma of Kapralov and Talwar, that shows that the
standard “matrix deflation” method can be applied even given only approximate eigenvectors.
The lemma here is actually an easy modification of the lemma from [KT13]. The details can
be found in Appendix B
Lemma 5.1 (Deflation Lemma [KT13]). Let A be a symmetric matrix with eigenvalues λ1 > . . . >
λn. There exists a constant C > 0 so that the following holds. Let x be any unit vector such that
‖Ax‖ > (1−α/C)λ1, where α ∈ (0,1). Let A′ = A− tv · vT , where t ∈ (1±α/C)‖Ax‖. Denote the
eigenvalues of A′ by λ′1 > . . . > λ′n.
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1. λk 6 λ′k−1 6min(λk−1,λk +αλ1) for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
We now argue that deflation preserves incoherence. Here, we make use of two lemmas
from [HR12].
Definition 5.2 (µ0-coherence). Let U be an n×r matrix with orthonormal columns and r 6 n.
Recall, that PU =UUT . The µ0-coherence of U is defined as
µ0(U ) =
n
r
max
16j6n
‖PU ej‖2 = nr max16j6n‖U(j)‖
2 . (7)
Here, ej denotes the j-th n-dimensional standard basis vector and U(j) denotes the j-th row of
U. The µ0-coherence of an n×n matrix A of rank r given in its singular value decomposition
UΣV T where U ∈Rn×r is defined as µ0(U ).
Observe that we always have µ0(A) 6 µ(A).
Lemma 5.3 ([HR12]). Let u1, . . . ,ur ∈ Rn be orthonormal vectors. Pick unit vectors n1, . . . ,nk ∈
Sn−1 uniformly at random. Assume that
n > c0k(r + k) log(r + k) (8)
where c0 is a sufficiently large constant. Then, there exists a set of orthonormal vectors v1, . . . ,vr+k ∈
Rn such that span{v1, . . . , vr+k} = span{u1, . . . ,ur ,n1, . . . ,nk} and furthermore, with probability
99/100,
µ0([v1 | · · · | vr+k]) 6 2µ0([u1 | · · · | uk]) +O
(
k logn
r
)
Lemma 5.4 ([HR12]). Let U be an orthonormal n×r matrix. Suppose w ∈ range(U ) and ‖w‖ = 1.
Then,
‖w‖2∞ 6 rn ·µ0(U ) .
Lemma 5.5. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a matrix. Define a set of vectors s1, . . . , sk and matrices A′1, . . . ,A′k
as follows. Let A′0 = A. For each i, si = A′i−1ti + cini , where ti ∈ Rn is an arbitrary vector, ci is
an arbitrary real number, and ni ∈ Sn−1 is selected uniformly at random. Let A′i = A′i−1 − disisTi ,
where di is an arbitrary real number. Then for all i:
µ(A′i) 6 2rµ(A) +O (i logn)
Proof. We write A =
∑r
j=i σjujv
T
j . The proof will follow easily from Lemma 5.3 and the
following claim.
Claim 5.6. For i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, letw1, . . . ,wr+i denote the left singular vectors ofA′i . Then,w1, . . . ,wr+i ∈
span(u1, . . . ,ur ,n1, . . . ,ni).
Proof. We prove this by induction. The claim is immediate when i = 0, which forms the
base case. For the inductive case, consider A′i = A
′
i−1 − disisTi . Write the singular value
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decomposition of A′i−1 as: A
′
i−1 =
∑r+i−1
j=1 σ
′
jyjz
T
j , and write the singular value decomposition
of A′i as: A
′
i =
∑r+i
j=1λjwjx
T
j . We can also write A
′
i =
∑r+i−1
j=1 σ
′
jyjz
T
j − disisTi . Therefore, for all j,
λjwj = A
′
ixj =
r+i−1∑
`=1
(
σ ′`〈xj , z`〉
)
y` −
(
di〈xj , si〉
)
si
Therefore, wj ∈ span(y1, . . . , yr+i−1, si). But si = A′i−1ti + cini , so si ∈ span(y1, . . . , yr+i−1,ni), and
by our inductive assumption, y1, . . . , yr+i−1 ∈ span(u1, . . . ,ur ,n1, . . . ,ni−1). Therefore, we can
conclude that wj ∈ span(u1, . . . ,ur ,n1, . . . ,ni) for all j. 
By Lemma 5.3, we can conclude that for all j, wj ∈ span(v′1, . . . , v′r+i) such that v′1, . . . , v′r+i
are orthonormal with:
µ0(v
′
1 | . . . | v′r+i) 6 2µ0(A) +O
(
i logn
r
)
6 2µ(A) +O
(
i logn
r
)
.
Therefore, we have:
µ(A′i) = n · max
j∈[r+i]
‖wj‖2∞ 6 rµ0(v′1 | . . . | v′r+i) 6 2rµ(A) +O (i logn)
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 5.4. 
We are now ready to state our results for obtaining good rank k approximations in the
spectral norm. First, we translate our bounds from Section 4 into a statement about rank-1
matrix approximation.
Theorem 5.7. Let γ,β > 0. Let A be a matrix satisfying σc 6 (1 − γ/2)σ1 for some c > 1. Put
T = 4log(σ1(A)). Further assume A satisfies
‖A‖2 =
ΘT c
√
µ(A) log(1/δ) log(n)
εγβ
. (9)
for some sufficiently large constant Θ > 0. Then, with probability 7/10, on input of A, T , (ε,δ) and
C > 9µ(A) log(n), the algorithm rank-k(A,T ,ε,δ,1) outputs a rank 1 matrix A1 such that:
‖A−A1‖2 6 σ2(A) + βσ1(A) .
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 4.4, together with Corollary B.4, and the observa-
tion that:
P {|σ̂1 − σ1| > c · βσ1} = exp(−ε′βσ1) =O
(
n−cT
√
µ(A)/γ
)
= o(1)
Therefore, with probability at least 7/10, both of the hypotheses of Corollary B.4 are satisfied.

Our rank k approximation result follows similarly, but we lose a factor of
√
r, where r is
the rank of the initial matrix to be approximated, due to the potential degradation in matrix
coherence during the deflation process. It is not clear whether this factor of r is necessary, or
whether it is an artifact of our analysis.
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Theorem 5.8. Let γ,β > 0. Fix a Let A be a rank r matrix such that there exist indices c1, . . . , ck
such that for each i: σci 6 (1 − γ/2)(σi − (i − 1)βσ1). Put T = 4log(σ1(A)). Further assume A
satisfies
σi(A) >
ΘT ck
√
(rµ(A) +
√
k logn) log(k/δ) log(n)
εγβ
. (10)
for each i ∈ [k]. for some sufficiently large constant Θ > 0. Then, with probability 7/10, on input
of A, T , (ε,δ) and C > 9µ(A) log(n), the algorithm rank-k(A,k,T ,ε,δ) outputs a rank k matrix Ak
such that:
‖A−Ak‖2 6 σk+1(A) + kβσ1(A) .
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 4.4, together with Corollary B.4, and our bound
on the degradation of the coherence of A under deflation, Lemma 5.5 
6 Lower Bound
In this section, we prove a lower bound showing that our dependence on the coherence
µ is tight. For every value of µ ∈ [2,n], there is a family of n × n matrices such that no
ε-differentially private algorithm A can compute a vector A(M) = v with the guarantee that
‖Av‖ > σ1 − o
(√
µ
ε
)
.
Theorem 6.1. For every value of C ∈ [2,n], there is a family of n×n matricesMC such that:
1. For every M ∈MC , µ(M) = C
2. For any δ = Ω(1/n), no (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm A : Rn×n → Rn has the
guarantee that for everyM ∈MC , with constant probability,A(M) = v such that ‖Mv‖/‖v‖ >
σ1(M)− o
(√
C
ε
)
.
Remark 6.2. Note that this theorem shows that our upper bound for computing rank 1 approx-
imations to incoherent matrices is tight along the entire curve of values µ, up to logarithmic
factors.
Proof. For each C ∈ [2,n], we define our family of matricesMC as follows. Let D ⊂Rn be the
set of boolean valued vectors with exactly n/2 non-zero entries: D = {D ∈ {0,1}n : ‖D‖0 = n/2}.
We will intuitively think of each D ∈ D as a private bit-valued database, whose entries we
are protecting with a guarantee of differential privacy. For each D ∈ D, let D¯ = D/‖D‖2 be
the rescaling of D to a unit vector. Note that D¯ ∈ {0,√2/√n}n. Define s(C) = n/C, and u ∈Rd
to be the vector such that ui = 1/
√
s(C) for i ∈ {1, . . . , s(C)} and ui = 0 for i > s(C). Finally, we
define our class of matricesMC to be:
MC =
{
MD :MD =
(√
ns(C)/2
)
u · D¯T :D ∈ D
}
Note that each MD ∈M is a matrix in which the first s(C) rows are identical copies of the
database D ∈ {0,1}n, and the remaining n− s(C) rows are the zero vector. Moreover, for each
M ∈MC , we have
σ1(M) =
√ns(C)√2
 = ( n√
2C
)
, and µ(M) = n ·max
(
1
s(C)
,
2
n
)
=
n
s(C)
= C
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Now consider any unit vector v. For each MD ∈MC , we have:
‖MDv‖2 =
√
σ1(MD )2 · 〈D¯,v〉2
s(C)
· s(C) = σ1(MD ) · 〈D¯,v〉 (11)
Therefore, any unit vector v such that ‖MDv‖2 > 9991000σ1(MD ) must be such that 〈D¯,v〉 > 9991000
However, if we view D as being a private database, it is clear that it is not possible to privately
approximate it well:
Lemma 6.3. For δ 6 1/5, Let B :Rn→R be a (1,δ)-differentially private algorithm with respect
to the entries of its input vector. Let D ∈ D be chosen uniformly at random. Then with probability
> 1/2 B(D) = v such that 〈D¯,v/‖v‖2〉 6 1− 21000 .
Proof. Let D ∈ D be a randomly chosen database D ∈ Rn with ‖D‖0 = n/2 entries. Let
D¯ = D/‖D‖ be its normalization to a unit vector. Suppose that v ∈ Rn is a unit vector such
that 〈D¯,v〉 > 1−α. We may therefore write:
v = (1−α)D¯ +
√
1− (1−α)2D¯⊥
where D¯⊥ is some unit vector orthogonal to D¯. We therefore have:
‖
√
n
2
v −D‖1 = ‖αD +
√
n
2
√
1− (1−α)2D¯⊥‖1
6 α‖D‖1 +
√
n
2
√
1− (1−α)2‖D¯⊥‖1
6 α‖D‖1 +
√
n
2
√
2α‖D¯⊥‖1
6 α
(n
2
)
+
√
2α
(
n√
2
)
6
n
2
(3
√
α)
Let D∗ denote the vector that results from setting D∗i = 1 in each coordinate i in which√
n
2vi > 1/2, and setting D
∗
i = 0 in all other coordinates. Since ‖
√
n
2v − D‖1 6 n2 (3
√
α), it
follows that ‖D∗ −D‖0 6 n2 (6
√
α). Now consider the probability that a randomly chosen index
i ∈ {i : Di > 0} is such that D∗i > 0. This occurs with probability at least 1 − (6
√
α). On the
other hand, consider the probability that a randomly chosen index j∗ ∈ {i :Di = 0} is such that
D∗j > 0. This occurs with probability at most (6
√
α) Note also that because (over the random
choice of D), each index i ∈ D is set to 1 uniformly at random, i and j are drawn from the
same marginal distribution. Finally, consider the neighboring database D ′ = D − {i} + {j},
and note that D ′ is also uniformly distributed among the set of databases D. We therefore
have that by differential privacy: (1− (6√α)) 6 e · (6√α) + δ. If α < 11000 and δ < 1/5, this is a
contradiction.

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It remains to observe that changing a single entry of D results in changing s(C) = n/C
entries of MD . Therefore, by the composition properties of differential privacy, any algorithm
A : Rn×n which is (ε,δ)-differentially private with respect to entry changes in its input is
((n/C)ε, (n/C)δ)-differentially private with respect to entry changes in D when given MD as
input. Therefore, Lemma 6.3 taken together with equation 11 implies that if ε 6 C/n and
δ 6 (C/(5n)), then no (ε,δ)-differentially private algorithm, when given as input a uniformly
randomly chosen matrix MD ∈ MC can with probability greater than 1/2 return a vector
A(MD ) = v such that
‖MDv‖2 > σ1(1− 1/1000) = σ1 −
(
n
1000
√
2C
)
Finally, for point of contradiction, suppose that there was an ε-differentially private
algorithm that for every matrix M, with probability greater than 1/2 returned a vector
A(M) = v such that ‖Mv‖ > σ1(M)− o
(√
C
ε
)
. Letting ε = C/n, and letting M =MD be chosen
fromMC , we would have that:
‖Mv‖2 > σ1(M)− o
(
n√
C
)
which is a direct contradiction. This completes the proof.

7 Conclusions and Open Problems
We have shown nearly optimal data dependent bounds for privately computing the top
singular vector of a matrix, in terms of its µ-coherence. We conclude with several specific
open problems, as well as a general research agenda.
Specifically, it would be nice to resolve the following technical questions:
1. We have shown that our dependence on µ-coherence is tight, but it remains possible
that there might be a weaker notion of coherence that this or other algorithms could
take advantage of. One candidate is µk-coherence, which only bounds the magnitude
of the entries in the top k singular vectors, and leaves the others unconstrained. We
do not know how to show that µk-coherence is sufficient to bound the quality of the
approximation to the top singular vector. However, as evidence of this conjecture,
in Appendix C, we show that the local sensitivity of the powering operation can be
bounded in terms of µk coherence.
2. When we “deflate” A so as to recurse and compute an approximation to the higher
singular vectors, we lose a 1-time factor of
√
r in the coherence, where r is the rank
of the matrix. As a result, our bounds for rank k approximation for k > 2 have a
dependence on the matrix rank. Can this factor of
√
r be removed, or is it inherent?
More generally, this paper is an instance of a broader research agenda: overcoming worst-
case lower bounds in differential privacy by giving data-dependent accuracy bounds. In
many settings (especially if the data set is small), the worst case bounds necessary to achieve
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differential privacy can be prohibitive. However, natural data sets tend to have structural
properties (like low coherence) that can potentially be taken advantage of in a variety of
settings. It would be interesting to understand the relevant features of the data that allow
more accurate private analyses in domains other than spectral analysis.
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A Deviation bounds
Lemma A.1 (Gaussian Anti-Concentration). Let ξi ∼N (0,1) and let ai > 0 for 1 6 i 6 n. Then,
for every γ > 0,
P
 n∑
i=1
aiξ
2
i 6 γ
n∑
i=1
ai
 6 √eγ .
We thank George Lowther for pointing out the following proof.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that
∑n
i=1 ai = 1 and γ < 1. For every λ > 0,
we have
P
 n∑
i=1
aiξ
2
i 6 γ
n∑
i=1
ai
 6 Eeλ(γ−∑ni=1 aiξ2i ) = eλγ n∏
i=1
Eeaiξ
2
i = eλγ
n∏
i=1
(1 + 2λai)
−1/2
6 eλγ (1 + 2λ)−1/2 .
The claim follows by setting λ = (γ−1 − 1)/2. 
The following direct consequence was needed earlier.
Lemma A.2. Let U be a k-dimensional subspace of Rn and let g ∼N (0,1)n. Then,
1. for every γ > 0, P
{
‖PUg‖ 6
√
γk
}
6
√
eγ .
2. for every t > 1, we have P
{
‖PUg‖ >
√
tk
}
6 exp(−t) .
Proof. The first claim follows directly by Lemma A.1. The second can be verified by direct
computation. 
Theorem A.3 (Chernoff bound). Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xm be independent random
variables. Let X =
∑m
i=1Xi and let σ
2 = V X. Then, for any t > 0,
P {|X −EX | > t} 6 exp
(
− t
2
4σ2
)
.
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B Proofs from Section 5
Lemma B.1 (Deflation Lemma [KT13]). Let A be a symmetric matrix with eigenvalues λ1 >
. . . > λn. There exists a constant C > 0 so that the following holds. Let x be any unit vector such
that xTAx > (1−α/C)λ1, where α ∈ (0,1). Let A′ = A− tv · vT , where t ∈ (1±α/C)xTAx. Denote
the eigenvalues of A′ by λ′1 > . . . > λ′n.
1. λk 6 λ′k−1 6min(λk−1,λk +αλ1) for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
Because our algorithm returns a vector v with a guarantee on the quantity ‖Av‖, rather
than on the Rayleigh Quotient vTAv, we must relate these two quantities, which we do
presently.
Lemma B.2. For any unit vector x, |xTAx| 6 ‖Ax‖
Proof. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, |xTAx| = |〈x,Ax〉| 6 ‖x‖ · ‖Ax‖ = ‖Ax‖. 
We now prove a partial converse, for vectors x such that ‖Ax‖ is large.
Lemma B.3. For any 0 6 α 6 1/4 and for any unit vector x such that ‖Ax‖ > (1−α)λ1:
xTAx > (1− 5α)λ1
Proof. Let v1, . . . , vn denote the eigenvectors of A in order from largest to smallest eigenvalue:
|λ1| > . . . > |λn|. Then we may write x = ∑ni=1αi · vi . Likewise Ax = ∑ni=1αiλi · vi , where∑n
i=1α
2
i = 1, since x is a unit vector. Hence, ‖Ax‖ =
√∑n
i=1α
2
i λ
2
i and x
TAx = 〈x,Ax〉 =∑n
i=1α
2
i λi .
We define:
i∗ ,max{1 6 i 6 n : |λi | > λ1(1− 4α)}
to be the largest index such that the i∗’th eigenvalue has magnitude at least (1− 4α)λ1. Now
define the quantities:
S1 ,
i∗∑
i=1
α2i S2 ,
n∑
i=i∗+1
α2i
and note that S2 = 1− S1. We can calculate:
(1−α)λ1 6
√
n∑
i=1
α2i λ
2
i
6
√
S1λ
2
1 + S2(1− 4α)λ21
6 λ1
(√
S1 +
√
1− S1
√
1− 4α
)
6 λ1
(√
S1 +
√
1− S1(1− 2α)
)
Solving for S1, we find:
S1 >
1− 4α + 8α2 − 10α3 + 6α4 + (−1 +α)(−1 + 2α)√1 +α(−2 + 3α)
2(1 + 2(−1 +α)α)2 > 1− 4α
2.
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Therefore, we also have S2 6 4α2. Finally, we may calculate:
xTAx =
n∑
i=1
α2i λi > S1(1− 4α)λ1 − S2(1− 4α)λ1 > (1− 8α2)(1− 4α)λ1 > (1− 5α)λ1
where the last inequality holds since α 6 1/4 
As a corollary, we get a modified version of the deflation lemma of [KT13]
Corollary B.4 (Modified Deflation Lemma [KT13]). Let A be a symmetric matrix with eigen-
values λ1 > . . . > λn. There exists a constant C > 0 so that the following holds. Let x be any unit
vector such that ‖Ax‖ > (1−α/C)λ1, where α ∈ (0,1). Let A′ = A−tv ·vT , where t ∈ (1±α/C)‖Ax‖.
Denote the eigenvalues of A′ by λ′1 > . . . > λ′n.
1. λk 6 λ′k−1 6min(λk−1,λk +αλ1) for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
C Perturbation bounds for matrix powers
In this section we prove a perturbation bound for matrix powers. The result be seen as
bounding the so-called local sensitivity of power iteration. Notably, we can use following
notion weaker form of µ-coherence that depends only on the top few singular singular
vectors.
Definition C.1. Let M be a real valued m × n matrix with singular value decomposition
M =
∑n
i=1σiuiv
T
i , where σ1 > σ2 > ... > σn > 0. We define the top-k coherence of M as
µk(M) =
k
max
i=1
max
{
m‖ui‖2∞,n‖vi‖2∞
}
.
Note that 1 6 µk(M) 6max{m,n}.
Theorem C.2. Let q > 1 be a number. Let M be a real valued n× n matrix with singular value
decomposition M =
∑n
i=1σiuiv
T
i , where σ1 > σ2 > ... > σn > 0. Assume that σ1 > 4q, σk+1 6 σ1/2
and q > logn+ 1. Then, with g ∼N (0,1)n,
E‖ ((M +E)q −Mq)g‖2 6 9min
1,
√
k ·µk(M)
n
qσ q−11 .
Remark C.3. We note that the above bound could easily be turned into a high probability guaran-
tee.
The next lemma will be helpful in simplifying some expressions arising in the proof of
the theorem.
Lemma C.4. Let E = eseTt and α > 1, Then,
– E2 = E if s = t and E2 = 0 otherwise.
– EMαE = CαE, where Cα =
∑n
i=1σ
α
i 〈ui , es〉〈vi , et〉 .
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Proof. Both claims are immediate. 
In the following we will use C = µk(M) as a shorthand.
Lemma C.5. Let δ = min
{√
kC/n,1
}
. Then, Cα 6 δ2σα1 +
σα1
2α .
Proof. Appealing to the definition of Cα from Lemma C.4, we have
Cα =
n∑
i=1
σαi 〈ui , es〉〈ui , et〉 =
k∑
i=1
σαi 〈ui , es〉〈vi , et〉+
n∑
i=k+1
σαi 〈ui , es〉〈vi , et〉
6 δ2σα1 +
σα1
2α
n∑
i=k+1
〈ui , es〉〈vi , et〉
6 δ2σα1 +
σα1
2α
‖es‖‖et‖ = δ2σα1 +
σα1
2α
.

Lemma C.6. Recall that δ = min
{√
kC/n,1
}
. We have,
E‖MαEMβg‖ 6
(
δσα1 +
σα1
2α
)δσβ1 + σβ12β
 .
Proof. First note that
E‖MαEMβg‖2 = ‖Mαes‖2E〈eTt Mβ , g〉2 = ‖Mαes‖2‖eTt Mβ‖2 ,
where we used that g ∼N (0,1)n. Hence, by Jensen’s inequality,
E‖MαEMβg‖ 6
√
E‖MαEMβg‖2 = ‖Mαes‖ · ‖eTt Mβ‖ .
It remains to bound the right hand side of the previous inequality. Indeed,
‖Mαes‖ =
√
n∑
i=1
σ2αi 〈ui , es〉2 6
√
Ck
n
σα1 +
σα1
2α
√√
k∑
i=1
〈ui , es〉2 6
√
Ck
n
σα1 +
σα1
2α
.
We can bound ‖eTt Mβ‖ with the same reasoning. 
Lemma C.7. Let A =Mα1EMα2E · · ·EMα`−1EMα` with αi > 0. Then,
E‖Ag‖ 6
(σ1
2
)∑`
i=1αi
+ δ(1 + δ)`σ
∑`
i=1αi
1 .
Proof. First we apply Lemma C.4 to all intermediate terms EMαiE where i ∈ {2, . . . , ` − 1}.
Then we apply Lemma C.5 and Lemma C.6 to the remaining term. Noting that δ2 6 δ, since
0 6 δ 6 1, we have established that
E‖Ag‖ 6 σ
∑`
i=1αi
1
∏`
i=1
(
δ+
1
2αi
)
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On the other hand, it is not hard to see that the following inequality holds,
∏`
i=1
(
δ+
1
2αi
)
6
(1
2
)∑`
i=1αi
+ δ(1 + δ)` .

We are now ready to prove Theorem C.2.
Proof of Theorem C.2. Observe that the matrix (M+E)q−Mq equals the sum of 2q−1 matrices
that are either zero or of the form A =Mα1EMα2E · · ·EMα`−1EMα` as described in Lemma C.7.
Let us say that
∑`
i=1αi is the “order” of the matrix A. Clearly, the order of the matrix A is at
most q − ` + 1. Furthermore, there are at most (qz) matrices of order z.
Using the fact that
(q
z
)
6 qq−z and the assumption that q 6 σ1/4, we will apply Lemma C.7
to each such matrix and sum over the resulting error terms:
q−1∑
z=0
(
q
z
)
σ z1
( 1
2z
+ δ(1 + δ)q−i+z
)
6 q
q−1∑
z=0
(σ1
4
)q−z−1
σ z1
( 1
2z
+ δ2q−z+1
)
6 qσ q−11
q−1∑
z=0
( 1
2q−1
+
4δ
2q−z−1
)
6 qσ q−11
(
8δ+
q
2q−1
)
6 9δqσ q−11 .
In the last step we used that δ >
√
1/n and the assumption that q > log(n) + 1.
The theorem follows now straightforwardly. By the previous argument and linearity of
expectation, we have
‖((M +E)q −Mq)g‖ 6 9δqσ q−11 = 9min
1,
√
Ck
n
qσ q−11 .

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